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CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS UNDER THE TEXAS TRUST ACT
T HE enactment of the Texas Trust Act' in 1943 presented
to the courts of this state for the first time the problem of
clearly distinguishing between express trusts in realty created by
an agreement between the parties and trusts in land implied by
law regardless of the intention of the parties to prevent the unjust
enrichment of a person who wrongfully holds title to real prop-
erty.2 As the Trust Act was originally worded,' there was some
doubt as to whether or not the requirement that a trust of real
property be evidenced by a written memorandum4 applied to both
express and implied trusts.5 The Trust Act was amended by the
next session of the Legislature, however, to make it clear that the
Trust Act did not apply to constructive or resulting trusts.6
Prior to the Trust Act, Texas had no statutory provisions similar
to the seventh, eighth, and ninth sections of the English Statute
of Frauds.' Oral trusts in land were enforceable if they were
1TF.x. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 74251.
23 BOGeRT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 471 et seq.; 3 ScoTT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS (1939) § 462 et seq.; RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (1937) § 160 et seq.; 54
AM. JUR., Trusts, § 218 et seq.
3 "Sec. 2. Definition of trust. 'Trust' for the purposes of this Act, means an express
trust only, and does not include so-called 'business trusts'. " Acts 1943, c. 148, p. 232.
4 TFx. Rtv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948), art. 7425b-7.
Moorhead, The Texas Trust Act, 22 Tex. L. Rev. 123, 131 (1944).
' TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 7425b-2 now reads: "Definition of trust.
'Trust' for the purpose of this Act means an express trust only, and does not include
(1) resulting or constructive trusts...." Acts 1943, c. 148, § 2, p. 232, as amended,
Acts 1945, c. 77, § 1, p. 109. See Note, 23 Tex. L. Rev. 374 (1945).
T "The 7th Section provides that all declarations or creations of trusts or confidences
in any lands, tenements, or hereditaments shall be manifested or proved by some writ-
ing signed by the party who is enabled by law to declare such trust, etc.
"The 8th Section declares that all trusts or confidences (if lands, or tencinletlt-,. which
arise or result by the implication or construction of law, or are transferred by an act
or operation of law, shall be of the like force and effect, as if the statute had not been
made.
"The 9th, [siv] requires that all grants and assignments of any trust or confidences,
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based on agreements contemporaneous with an inter vivos transfer
of legal title, but self-declarations of trusts by persons already
having legal title were not enforceable unless they were evidenced
by written instruments! The former type of express trust was not
considered to be within the provisions of the Statute of Frauds
that had at that time been adopted in this state because it was
held that the written instrument transferring legal title to the
property satisfied the requirement of the statute.! The latter type
of express trusts was, however, considered to be an oral convey-
ance or contract for the sale of land unenforceable because of
the Statute of Conveyancing" or the Statute of Frauds." Since
no instrument in writing was required to create a trust in land
agreed to at the time of a transfer of title- a situation which
arose frequently before the passage of the Trust Act-parol evi-
dence was admissible to prove most express and implied trusts in
land;"2 therefore, it was not necessary for the courts to distinguish
between express and implied trusts in particular cases. 3 This fail-
ure of the courts to spell out the type of trust which they were
enforcing in cases decided prior to the Trust Act has resulted
in considerable difliculty in applying those cases14 to transactions
occurring after the passage of the Act. Since the enactment of the
Trust Act, the Texas Supreme Court has imposed constructive
shall likewise be in writing, or be utterly void and of none effect." James v. Fulcrod,
5 Tex. 512, 517 (1851).
s Huie, The Coninanity Property Law of Texas, VERNON'S TEX. CIv. STAT. ANN.,
v. 13 .(1951), pp. VII. XII.
9 Allen v. Allen, 101 Tex. 362, 197 S. W. 528 (1908).
1OTx. R.v. CIr. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1288.
TK "x. REV. CV. STAr. (Vernon, 1948) art. 3995.
12 "We need not determine, therefore, whether the trust established by the evi-
dence ... was a constructive trust or an express trust, for prior to the effective date of
that act paro) evidence was admissible to establish either." Sevine v. Heissner, 148
Tex. 345, 349, 224 S. W. 2d 184, 186 (1949), rev'g 220 S. W. 2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949).
13 Fitz-Gerald v. Hull ............- Tex .............. 237 S. W. 2d 256, 260 (1951).
14 For a review of the cases prior to the Trust Act, see Guittard, Express Oral Trusts
of Land in Texas, 21 Tex. L. Rev. 719 (19.13).
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trusts in some situations,15 and has refused to do so in other situa-
tions,16 without having been compelled to consider the effect of the
Act, if any, on implied trusts. Several cases, however, declare that
the Trust Act is not applicable to transactions out of which trusts
arose prior to the date of the enactment of the statute."
A constructive trust has probably been best defined by Mr.
Justice Cardozo in these words:
A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of
equity finds expression. When property has been acquired in such cir-
cumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience
retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee.18
Although the distinction between express and constructive trusts
appears to be clear,19 the courts experience difficulty in making it
in cases involving an abuse of a confidential relationship. A con-
structive trust is not a "fiduciary relationship," as is an express
trust, but one type of situation which gives rise to a constructive
trust involves the abuse of "confidential relationship," which may
or may not be a "fiduciary relationship."2 In both express and
implied trusts the person who has the legal title to the property
in question is under an equitable duty to deal with the property
for the benefit of another person, but this is the extent of the simi-
larity between the two types of trusts.2 An express trust is a result
of the intention of the parties, whereas a constructive trust is im-
posed by the courts to prevent the unjust enrichment of a party
15 Cecil v. Dollar, 147 Tex. 541, 218 S. W. 2d 448 (1949) ; Edwards v. Strong, 147
Tex. 155, 213 S. W. 2d 979 (1948) ; Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex. 18, 211 S. W. 2d 559
(1948).
16 Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 218 S. W. 2d 428 (1949) ; Warner v. Winn, 145
Tex. 302, 197 S. W. 2d 338 (1946).
7 S(evine v. Heissner, 148 Tex. 345, 224 S. W. 2d 184 (1949) ; Binford v. Snyder,
144 Tex. 134, 189 S. W. 2d 471 (1945) ; Dickens v. Dickens 241 S. W. 2d 658 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951) er. rel. n.r.e.; Smith v. Dean, 240 S. W. 2d 789 ('rex. Civ. App. 1951)
Hueschen v. Dunn, 219 S. W. 2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
18 Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N. Y. 380, 122 N. E. 378, 380 (1949).
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who has breached a confidential relationship in regard to the
property." A constructive trust is said to relate back to the time
of the breach of the confidential relationship, but the only duty
of the trustee is to convey the property to the person in whose favor
a constructive trust is imposed by the court. Actually, no trust is
created by the court, but a constructive trust is the means by which
title to the property in question is vested or reinvested in the per-
son who is equitably entitled to it.2"
The first important case in which the Supreme Court of Texas
considered the effect of the Texas Trust Act on the use of the
equitable device of a constructive trust was Mills v. Gray.24 There
a husband and wife conveyed property to the wife's son to facili-
tate a property settlement prior to obtaining a divorce, the convey-
ance being subject to an oral promise by the son that he would
reconvey to the wife and her other children after the divorce, or
divide the proceeds upon a sale. The property was sold and the
proceeds used to purchase other property with the consent of the
wife, who contended that title to the property purchased was to be
taken in her name. Instead, the son took title to the property in
his own name and refused to perform his promise to convey the
property to his mother and the other children. In a suit to impress
a constructive trust, the trial court ruled that evidence of the
agreement was inadmissible because of the parol evidence rule.
The supreme court, however, held that the parol evidence rule
would not prevent the imposition of a constructive trust on the
property in the son's hands. Quoting from the Restatement of
Trusts,"6 the court decided that the requirement of the Trust Act
22 Ibid.
23 Id., § 462.4.
24 147 Tex. 33, 210 S. W. 2d 985 (1948), afl'g 206 S. W. 2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947).
"5 "§ 44. Effect of Failure of Oral Trust for Settlor.
"(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it inter viVOs to another in
trust for the transferor, but no memorandum properly evidencing the intention to
create a trust is signed, and the transferee refuses to perform the trust, the transferee
holds the interest upon a constructive trust for the transferor, if...
"(h) the transferee at the time of the transfer was in a confidential relation to
the transferor...." Id. at 38. 210 S. W. 2d at 988.
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that express trusts in land be evidenced by a written instrument
did not prevent the imposition of a constructive trust where there
had been an abuse of a confidential relationship existing prior to
the conveyance.2" The court said:
... [I]f the purported agreement and family arrangement had been
established as true, a constructive trust would have arisen by reason
of the confidential relation between the parties which would not fall
within the prohibition of the Statute of Frauds or the Texas Trust Act.
The testimony was therefore erroneously excluded by the trial court."
The supreme court subsequently decided Edwards v. Strong.2"
The broker defendant had contracted orally to secure an option
to purchase property as plaintiff's agent. After the broker acquired
the option in his own name, he and other defendants, who had
notice of his fiduciary relationship to plaintiff, purchased the
property in the name of one of the other defendants. In their
suit to establish a constructive trust in plaintiff's favor, plaintiff
and her husband tendered into the court the full purchase price
which defendants paid for the property. The supreme court held
that the trial court was correct in imposing a constructive trust
although the option contract with the vendor was unenforceable
because it was not in writing. 9 The court said:
The respondents' right to enforce a constructive trust arises out of
the breach by Athans [the broker] of his fiduciary duty and the know-
ing participation therein by the Edwardses [the other defendants] and
the unjust enrichment which would result to the Edwardses, if they
were permitted to retain the land."
The indication of Mills v. Gray that the Texas courts would be
inclined to impose a constructive trust where the equities of the
situation demanded, regardless of the requirements of the Trust
26See Note, 27 Tex. L. Rev. 399 (1949).
27 147 Tex. at 40, 210 S. W. 2d at 989.
28 147 Tex. 155, 213 S. W. 2d 979 (1948), afl'g 297 S. W. 2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947). See Note, 3 Southwestern L. J. 175, 181 (1949).
21 Trx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 3995.
20 147 Tex. at 158, 213 S. W. 2d at 981.
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Act, seems to have been confirmed in Fitz-Gerald v. Hull."1 This
decision is probably the most important case concerning construc-
tive trusts decided since the enactment of the Texas Trust Act.
Plaintiffs Hull and Green and defendant Fitz-Gerald were friends
of long standing. They entered into an oral, coffee-cup agreement
that plaintiffs, who were oil company employees, would furnish
information concerning potentially productive oil and gas prop-
erties and that defendant, who was a drilling contractor, would
acquire an oil and gas lease on a selected tract of land in the
names of the three parties, who would share the profit or loss from
its development. Contrary to this agreement, defendant acquired
a lease on the tract selected in his own name and, after the prop-
erty had proved to be highly productive, denied that plaintiffs had
any interest in the lease. The trial court directed a verdict against
the plaintiffs in their suit to establish a constructive trust, being
of the opinion that the agreement was an attempt to create an
express oral trust in land in contravention of the Trust Act. The
supreme court held that the provision of the Trust Act requiring a
writing to establish an express trust in land was not applicable to
the agreement between the parties," and that the facts of the case
called for the imposition of a constructive trust because defendant
had abused the confidential relationship existing between the
parties33 as a result of their agreement to engage in a joint ven-
ture.34 The majority of the court said:
This trust arose not because there was any agreement for the title to
be taken in the name of petitioner [defendant], and the property to
be held by him in trust for the respondents [plaintiffs]-as would be
necessary to constitute an express trust-but, because under the facts,
equity would raise the trust to protect the rights of the respondents,
11 ............ Tex .............. 237 S. W. 2d 256 (1951), a/J'g 232 S. W. 2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950). Justice Garwood concurred in a separate opinion, Justice Smedley dissented,
and Justice Wilson did not participate.
32 Cf. Newton v. Gardner, 225 S. W. 2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) er. ref. n.r.e.,
and Klein v. Sibley, 203 S. W. 2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
s8 Citing 54 AM. JUR., Trusts, §§ 225-228.
34 Citing 30 Am. JuR., Joint Adventurers, § 34.
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and to prevent the unjust enrichment of petitioner by his violation of
his promise and duty to the respondents to take title in the name of the
three of them, and for their mutual profit and advantage....
We see that the state of facts we have in the instant case does not
come within any of the.. . "means or methods" whereby an express
trust may be created under the terms of the Trust Act. Therefore, such
Trust Act cannot apply to our case, and we do not have an express
trust present....
The pleadings and proof show that the three parties agreed to enter
into a joint adventure regarding this oil and gas lease and that each
had a duty to perform to further the common interest. In carrying out
this common interest each joint adventurer owed the highest duty to
the other so to act as to further their joint interest, and each was an
agent of the other. The petitioner violated this duty in taking the title
in his own name, and seeking to appropriate all the profits to his own
use and benefit. Equity will force him to disgorge and to divide his
gains with the other joint adventurers in accordance with their original
agreement.""
A dissenting opinion took issue with the majority opinion pri-
marily because the majority based its decision on the fact that the
agreement was that title to the lease was to be taken in the names
of all three parties rather than in the name of defendant in trust
for plaintiffs. The dissenting justice was of the opinion that this
was a distinction without substance, as the contemplated result in
either event would be that defendant would acquire the lease for
the benefit of himself and plaintiffs. The dissenting justice also
disagreed with the majority determination that the oral agreement
was to engage in a joint adventure which gave rise to a fiduciary
relationship between the parties, being of the opinion that there
was only an oral promise to buy land for others, which did not
give rise to a confidential relationship. 6 He was also of the opinion
that there was no proof of such equities in plaintiffs' favor as
would warrant the use of a constructive trust. Although he recog-
nized that there were exceptions to the principle that constructive
3.1237 S. W. 2d at 259, 261, 264.
so Citing 54 AM. JuR., Trusts, § 48; Note, 42 A. L. R. 10 (1926), supplemented by
135 A. L. R. 232 (1941).
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trusts are used primarily for the purpose of restitution," he
concluded:
If under the facts of this case the prohibition of the statute [Article
7425b-7] can be avoided, then it is difficult to conceive of any case in
which effect can be given to that part of the statute, and if the opinion
of the majority stands, the law of this state with respect to parol trusts
in realty will be substantially the same as it was before the enactment
of the Texas Trust Act.'
This conclusion of the dissenting opinion seems to be warranted
by the cases, but the result reached by the majority opinion ap-
pears to be desirable. Although the distinction upon which the
majority opinion based its decision is questionable, a principal
point of conflict was whether there had been a showing that the
oral agreement in question created a confidential relationship
between the parties which had been abused by the defendant.89
Fitz-Gerald v. Hull was followed in the later case of Schiller v.
Elick,4" where the plaintiff brought suit to impose a constructive
trust on a one-fourth mineral interest in land which defendant
allegedly sold as the agent of plaintiff and her husband. Defend-
ant, who claimed to have been a purchaser in an arm's-length
transaction, was alleged to have informed plaintiff and her hus-
band that a purchaser was willing to buy the land with a one-half
mineral interest reserved by the vendors. Subject to this reserva-
tion, the property was deeded to defendant, who conveyed it to the
ultimate purchaser the same day, reserving a one-fourth mineral
interest in himself. The court decreed that defendant held the one-
fourth mineral interest in constructive trust for plaintiff, as he
37 237 S. W. 2d at 270, 271, citing RESTATEMENT, RESTITUnON (1937) § 160. Section
194 provides: "(2) A person who agrees with another to purchase property on behalf
of the other and purchases the property for himself individually holds it upon a con-
structive trust for the other, even though he is not under a duty to purchase the prop-
erty for the other."
38 237 S. W. 2d at 273.
89 See infra note 48.




had violated his fiduciary duty to plaintiff and her husband by not
informing them that the purchaser was willing to buy the land with
only a one-fourth mineral interest. The court said:
It might be argued that this holding imposes a higher standard
of business ethics upon the parties to a real-estate transaction than the
law has a right to expect. The growth of the law has been consistently
towards higher ethical standards.... Extending the term "fiduciary"
beyond formal relationships (as, for example, guardian and ward)
widens the possibility of attack by perjury upon legal instruments, but
this has been determined as not controlling in Fitz-Gerald v. Hull,
supra, and cases there cited. 1
The decisions of the Texas courts are following the modem
tendency of a broad construction of the term "confidential rela-
tionship" rather than limiting it to strict fiduciary relationships. 2
They are also construing the word "fraud" in the broader sense
of the term "constructive fraud."4 " Although the general rule and
Texas rule are that agreements to hold land in trust must be in
writing to be enforceable, 4 the tendency is to limit this rule to
arm's-length transactions and to impose constructive trusts in
those cases where there is clear and convincing proof of the abuse
of an antecedent confidential relationship between the parties.
4
The problem involved in cases where a person seeks to impose
a constructive trust in land because there has been a breach of a
confidential relationship is primarily one of whether the policy
underlying the Statute of Frauds should prevail over the policy
upon which the equitable doctrine of preventing unjust enrichment
is based. The Statute of Frauds was enacted to avoid adjudication
of interests in land on the basis of conflicting and perjured oral
testimony. It was recognized that the courts in many instances
could only guess which litigant and witnesses, if any, were telling
41 240 S. W. 2d at 1001.
42 See authoritits cited in 54 AM. JUR., Trusts, §§ 225-228.
43See Note, 159 A. L. R. 1007 (1945), supplementing Notes in 129 A. L. I. 689
(1940), 159 A. L. 1. 195 (1932), 45 A. L. R. 815 (1926) anti 35 A. L. R. 280 (1925).
44 See authorities cited in 54 AM. Jus., Trusts, § 54 et seq.
"5 See, for example, Kochorimbus v. Maggos, 323 Il. 510, 154 N. E. 235 (1926).
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the truth. The requirement of a writing goes far to insure that the
actual agreement of the parties can be accurately determined and
spurious claims to title thwarted. When a legislative enactment
provides that failure to reduce an agreement concerning land to
writing will result in the attendant penalty of unenforceability, it
is fair to assume that in a short time persons entering into such
an agreement will be careful to reduce it to writing. Within a rea-
sonable time one may infer that where an agreement is really
made, it will be expressed in some sort of written memorandum
and that non-existence of a writing means that no agreement was
made. Strict adherence to the Statute of Frauds by the courts will
avoid guesswork by the courts on conflicting oral testimony, elimi-
nate a prolific cause of litigation, and will eventually lead to a
situation where one can be confident that the only trusts actually
agreed upon are those which are put in writing. Thus, stability
and security of land titles as expressed in writing will be pro-
tected.
On tie other hand, one must admit that people persist in making
oral agreements concerning land even in jurisdictions where the
Statute of Frauds has been in effect for generations, and unscrupu-
lous individuals seek to take advantage of the provisions of the
Statute of Frauds to defraud innocent and confiding persons. The
exigencies of the modern business world dictate that many trans-
actions be conducted informally, and justice demands that the legal
requirement of formality be disregarded in some situations in
order to reach an equitable result. Judicial concern for the inno-
cent and unwary must, however, be circumscribed by the require-
ment that the equities of the party seeking to have a constructive
trust imposed be established by clear and convincing proof.
The conclusion has been stated that "in many of the situations
where an oral express trust was enforced prior to the Act, the
courts will be able to reach the same result now by classifying the
trust as resulting or construcitve.""' This conclusion seems to be
46 Huie, op. cit. supra note 9, p. XII.
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correct in the light of the cases decided since the enactment of the
Trust Act, particularly Fitz-Gerald v. Ifull. In fact, the cases indi-
cate that the imposition of a constructive trust is not necessarily
precluded even though the court determines that there was an
attempted creation of an express oral trust in land in contraven-
tion of the Trust Act.47 Before a constructive trust will be imposed
in such a case, however, there will have to be a showing of an
abuse of an antecedent confidential relation between the parties to
the oral trust. This is the ultimate issue in this type of cases. There
is always the possibility of a dismissal of such a case where in-
sufficient facts are alleged to raise an issue as to the existence of
a confidential relationship, or of a directed verdict where there
is insufficient evidence to establish such a relationship." The only
effect of the Trust Act on the imposition of constructive trusts
would seem to be that the possibility of such a trust being implied
by the court is precluded where there was an attempt to create an
express oral trust in land in an arm's-length transaction and there
was no previous confidential relationship between the parties. All
cases involving implied trusts necessarily rest on their particular
facts, and no hard and fast rules to govern such cases can be laid
down. This is the thesis stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo:
A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust is bound by no
unyielding formula. The equity of the transaction must shape the
measure of relief.49
James R. Kinzer.
47 It appears to be immaterial whether the person against whom the constructive
trust is imposed was guilty of fraud at the time he acquired title to the property in
question. See I ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 2, § 44.2.
48 See Mellette v. Hudstan Oil Corp., 243 S. W. 2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), where
the direction of a verdict against plaintiff in a case having a fact situation similar to
Fitz-Gerald v. Hull was affirmed on time ground of insufficient evidence to establish a
constructive trust.
49 Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N. Y. 380, 122 N. E. 378, 381 "(1919).
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